唐鹏程 One-vote veto: The threshold effect of environmental pollution in China's economic promotion tournament

我校新葡萄8883官网最新版游戏唐鹏程老师在T1级别期刊——《Ecological Economics》上发表题为“One-vote veto: The threshold effect of environmental pollution in China's economic promotion tournament”。论文第一作者唐鹏程为新葡萄8883官网最新版游戏特任副教授。

Abstract /摘要：

Frontier researches have gradually noticed that governing performance on both economic development and environmental pollution can impact the political promotion of local officials in China. However, existing literature mainly explains the assessment mechanism in an isolated manner, which may fail to explain local officials' strong incentive to reduce pollutant emission when economic performance still held a prior position. Using the data of 810 observations of municipal party secretaries from 281 cities during 2005–2015, this paper examines the threshold effect of environmental pollution on the municipal party secretaries' economic promotion tournament. The results demonstrate that only when environmental pollution is below a certain level, can economic performance significantly increase local officials' promotion probability. Moreover, the significant threshold effect only exists for cities with stricter environmental governance and lower economic growth target. This research provides a deeper understanding of the special role of environmental performance in local officials' promotion assessment in China, which also has practical implications for countries struggling economy-environment trade-off to learn how to overcome this dilem

论文信息;

Title/题目:

One-vote veto: The threshold effect of environmental pollution in China's economic promotion tournament

Authors/作者:

Tang Pengcheng; Jiang Qisheng; Mi Lili

Key Words /关键词：

Economic performance; Environmental pollution; Promotion tournament; Threshold effect; One-vote veto

Indexed by /核心评价：

WAJCI;SSCI;Scopus;SCI;AHCI;

研究要点/ Highlights

• The threshold effect of environmental pollution in local officials' economic promotion tournament in China is verified.;

• Only when below a certain level, can economic performance significantly increase local officials' promotion probability.;

• This threshold effect is more pronounced in cities with lower economic growth target and stricter environmental governance.

DOI：10.1016/J.ECOLECON.2021.107069

全文链接：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107069